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Article 8

BOOKS RECEIVED

THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK. By Jagdish
Bhagwati, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991,
156 pp.
"The promise of the Uruguay Round is so considerable, and the
downside from its failure would be so unfortunate, that it is hard to see
an agreement not finally emerging." When Jagdish Bhagwati wrote
this prediction in The World Trading System at Risk, the four-yearold GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Uruguay Round
anticipated a conclusion in December 1990. By that date, however, the
talks had stalled, largely over the EEC's intransigence on agricultural
subsidies and tariffs. Although the United States had set a deadline of
March 1992, the negotiations proceed slowly, and some observers predict no agreement until 1993.
Bhagwati, a professor of economics and political science at Columbia University, has faith in GATT and its need to survive. In The
World Trading System at Risk, Bhagwati addresses four threats to
GATT which result from a changing world economy and divisive.actions spurred by self-interest, panic and stereotyping: unfair trade,
managed trade, aggressive unilateralism and regionalism. After addressing these threats, Bhagwati offers some suggestions and some hope
for the Uruguay Round.
Cries of unfair trade by labor and business often convince reluctant governments to institute protectionist measures in opposition to
GATT. Increasingly, various interests point to more economically successful countries and cry foul, not merely because of tariffs, but because of a myriad of internal factors - from workers' rights to savings
rates. These accusations emanate from the United States, due to what
Bhagwati describes as "diminished giant syndrome." This syndrome results from the country's inability to cope with its diminished status in
the world economy, especially vis-a-vis the rise of Japan. Japan provides an appealing target for unfair trade accusations due to "regressive" U.S. stereotypes.
In addition to, and as a result of, unfair trade allegations, countries increasingly accuse each other of managed trade and demand such
protection for themselves. Managed trade clearly violates the GATT
(169)
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principle of fixed-rule trading. Bhagwati identifies three rationales for
these managed trade demands: managed trade already exists, high-tech
industries cannot be left to the market and Japan will not obey GATT
rules. In response to the first argument, Bhagwati acknowledges that
countries do subvert GATT fixed-rule trade, but argues that the GATT
structure has kept managed trade within reasonable bounds. As to
high-tech industries, Bhagwati suggests "trade management", not
"managed trade". That is, there must be a multilateral effort to identify why countries perceive others to have an unfair advantage and then
a campaign to eliminate those perceived threats.
However, the bulk of the author's attention is devoted to the problem of Japan's unwillingness to play by the rules of GATT regarding
managed trade. Bhagwati admits that Japan historically prefers to
trade on a quantitative basis rather than a fixed-rule system, and urges
that country to reject its trader mentality and participate in the architecture of trade. Nevertheless, Bhagwati rejects U.S. cultural and economic stereotypes to explain Japan's behavior. For example, countries
measure Japan's openness on a quantitative basis, so it is reasonable for
Japan to ask: "How much must we import from the Americans to satisfy their unreasonable but persistent concerns and thus to get them off
our backs?" In response to the cultural stereotype of the Japanese as
predators, Bhagwati simply responds that "[tihe successful always appear predatory."
Other stereotypes, argues Bhagwati, merely result from economic
common sense. Thus, the Japanese practice of long-term employment
helps keep well-trained, efficient workers on the job, and does not necessarily grow out of some quasi-familial relationship. Likewise, Japan's
desire for long-term supplier relationships simply makes economic
sense. Finally, there are often harmless reasons for Japan's low imports
in certain sectors. For example, generally smaller Japanese residences
cannot accommodate large American refrigerators.
Due to perceived unfair trade practices and managed trade, the
United States has aggressively demanded unilateral concessions from
other nations under the threat of tariffs. Such threats violate the
GATT treaty because they are discriminatory. In addition, Bhagwati
argues, the violation of GATT threatens the institution itself by flouting its rules and breeding cynicism. Even if others have violated GATT
principles, U.S. vigilantism does not right the wrong.
Finally, Bhagwati denies that increased regionalism necessarily
threatens GATT. Indeed, Article XXIV of GATT permits free trade
areas and customs unions and allowed the creation of the EEC. Yet,
despite the success of the Community, regionalism declined until recently. Due to Europe 1992 and the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agree-
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ment, Bhagwati predicts that the growth of regionalism will continue.
Regional trade agreements can be economically beneficial and can help
accomplish the multilateral goals of GATT by bringing more nations
into the agreement.
The U.S. resort to free-trade agreements derives from a perception
that GATT is changing too slowly to meet U.S. needs. As the U.S. and
other countries form blocs, competing countries feel compelled to respond in kind. Bhagwati fears that countries will begin to be identified
by blocs, not multilaterally under GATT, which may undermine the
Uruguay Round. These new blocs have also addressed issues, such as
services, with which GATT still struggles. Additionally, nations
threaten to form blocs in order to extract concessions from others and
use blocs as protectionist measures. For example, countries will unite
with a high tariff country and adopt that nation's tariff.
Bhagwati supports beneficial trade areas or customs unions, but
urges the participants to remember that GATT should be a priority.
GATT rules must be imposed, argues Bhagwati, so that all regions
compete on an equal basis. New regions are to be encouraged to enter
blocs in order to bring more participants into GATT. Finally, Bhagwati
urges a rule that each bloc adopt the lowest tariff on a good maintained
by a bloc member.
In his last chapter, Bhagwati briefly discusses the Uruguay Round
and offers suggestions for its success. Specifically, he criticizes the
traditional bargaining approach in which developing countries must offer concessions in new areas (such as services and intellectual property), in return for developed countries' concessions in the old areas
(textiles and agriculture). This approach muddles the concerns of countries and reduces the chances of an agreement. Instead, Bhagwati urges
a multi-tiered approach that addresses goods and new sectors separately. In terms of goods, developing countries should abandon special
protections under Article XVIII(b) and in exchange, developed countries should liberalize agriculture and dismantle restriction on textiles.
And in terms of new areas (services and intellectual property), each
issue should receive special attention. Thus, for example, developing
countries which believe GATT rules threaten their infrastructure - by
allowing, for example, foreign entities to control a country's banking
sector - should be gradually eased and coaxed into the system.
The World Trading System at Risk is a useful book, not only for
those knowledgeable about GATT, but also for those with a less sophisticated understanding of the institution and process. Bhagwati assumes
a certain familiarity with GATT and world trade terms and situations.
Therefore, the book can be a bit difficult for those lacking a background in international trade. (A helpful appendix is included which
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defines certain concepts and provides information about disputes settled
by GATT and GATT members.) However, even for novices, the book
provides a relatively quick instruction on major GATT issues, current
criticisms and threats to GATT, and a provocative perspective on its
problems.
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TERRORISM, POLITICS AND THE LAW. By Antonio Cassese,
Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, 162 pp.
An international lawyer should no longer write for rulers alone
(who may or may not heed his words); he ought now to write
mainly for ordinary citizens: he should offer them parameters
by which to judge international affairs, and analytical mechanisms for examining the intricacies of the world community.
In the foreword, Antonio Cassese uses this statement to explain
the purpose of his book. To achieve this objective he utilizes the hijacking of the Achille Lauro as a case study. The Achille Lauro was an
Italian cruise liner that was hijacked in October 1985. The terrorists
were Palestinians whose orders came from a faction of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) called the Palestinian Liberation Front
(PLF). The principal states involved were Egypt, Italy, the United
States, and, to a lesser extent, the Federal Republic of Germany. Mr.
Cassese states that he uses the Achille Lauro hijacking not because the
events were remarkable, but because the factual elements were well
documented and divergent views towards dealing with terrorism were
demonstrated. In his analysis, the author examines whether the states
involved respected, or failed to respect, international legal standards on
terrorism, and whether their actions were successful in psychological,
political, or diplomatic terms.
From the outset, Mr. Cassese's book is written for the layman. He
begins by providing a basic framework for both defining terrorism and
for the means to combat it. In defining terrorism, Mr. Cassese divides
the topic into four forms. The first form is used by those with highly
ideological inspirations - either political or religious. The second is
employed by those inspired by ideals of national independence (e.g., the
IRA, the Kurds, The Tamils). The third form is used by national liberation movements (e.g., the African National Congress and the PLO).
And finally there are armed bands or movements that are fighting oppressive regimes, such as those in Latin America. Despite these general
classifications, the author explains that developing a definition for terrorism which will be useful in the international sphere is difficult.
Broad definitions tend to encompass acts of war while more narrow
definitions allow those who commit acts of terrorism to legitimize their
acts by, in effect, defining them away.
In outlining the means to combat terrorism, Mr. Cassese states
that there are two possible forms of response. The first is 'peaceful'
which includes international treaties drawn up to coordinate the anti-
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terrorist efforts of states. These treaties normally provide for close international cooperation regarding the capture and imprisonment of terrorists and lay down rules for their extradition or trial. The other response is 'violent' which is the use of armed force to repress terrorism.
From this basic framework, Mr. Cassese analyzes the Achille Lauro
affair to provide the layman with the more specific tools to examine the
intricacies of the world community and judge international affairs.
Mr. Cassese first examines the agreement drafted by Egypt to give
the hijackers a safe-conduct. The agreement provided that the hijackers
were to surrender immediately upon two conditions: (1) no request
would be made for their extradition or punishment, and (2) the PLO
would take charge of the hijackers. Both the German and Italian ambassadors initialled the agreement and thus the three countries were
bound. The United States refused to sign the agreement due to a 1979
Convention of Hostage Taking to which it, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and Egypt were parties. The Convention required Egypt to
either try the hijackers or extradite them to the United States because
numerous passengers aboard the Achille Lauro were U.S. citizens.
In assessing the safe-conduct agreement, Mr. Cassese points out
that it had several merits. First, it put an end to the hijacking without
giving in to the terrorists' demands. Second, the hijacking was to end
without any loss of innocent life (however, although it was not clear at
the time, one American passenger had already been murdered). A third
advantage was that the terrorists were not to go free but were to be
handed over to the PLO to be tried. Yet, as Mr. Cassese explains, the
agreement also contained ambiguities which overshadowed its merits.
The agreement was drafted with the understanding that the hijackers
had not murdered any of the passengers. This was not, however, explicitly spelled out in the text of the agreement despite persistent rumors
that at least two passengers had been killed. Moreover, since the hijackers had in fact murdered one of the passengers, the agreement
would have been nullified, thus, paving the way for the use of force by
the United States.
Mr. Cassese then proceeds to assess the actions of the Egyptian,
American, and Italian governments in resolving the affair. Once the
terrorists had gone ashore it was confirmed that at least one passenger
had, in fact, been killed. Thus, the safe-conduct agreement was nullified and Egypt's only legal alternative was to abide by the 1979 Convention. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Government turned a deaf ear and
continued to consider the safe-conduct agreement as valid and allowed
the hijackers to board an Egyptian Boeing 737 headed for Tunis. As
Mr. Cassese explains, Egypt was in a dilemma. If Egypt were to respect the 1979 Convention, it ran the risk of both retaliation from the
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Palestinians as well as increased internal tensions from anti-American
factions. Therefore, Egypt's only practical alternative was to continue
to abide by the safe-conduct agreement. To legitimize its actions,
Egypt chose to ignore the murder of the American passenger and base
its refusal to abide by the 1979 Convention on the pretext that it was
bound by the safe-conduct agreement. Mr. Cassese states that on a
cost-benefit basis it may well have been better for Egypt to ignore the
1979 Convention than face a rupture in its relations with the Palestinians. However, by taking this course, Egypt faced serious political
repercussions from the United States if the PLO failed to punish the
terrorists for the murder of the American passenger.
The author next examines the United States' response to the affair. Unlike the other nations involved, the U.S. had a specific, established policy for dealing with terrorist attacks. Mr. Cassese describes
U.S. policy as a repressive strategy based on four main points: (1) no
terrorist demands should be met; (2) maximum diplomatic pressure
should be applied on the states directly or indirectly involved with the
terrorist's actions; (3) if a policy of firmness does not bring a solution,
the only alternative is the use of force; and 4) long-term solutions depend upon international cooperation in the form of multi-lateral treaties or economic and political sanctions. The U.S. response to the
Achille Lauro affair was the use of force. President Reagan ordered
four fighter planes to intercept the Egyptian Boeing 737 originally
headed for Tunis, forcing it to land at a NATO base in Sigonella,
Sicily.
Although it was within the confines of U.S. strategy, Mr. Cassese
criticizes the United States' use of force. Not only were these actions in
violation of international law set forth in the United Nations Charter,
but they endangered the lives of innocent people and set a dangerous
precedent for other nations to use similar actions. He asserts that the
U.S. response was more deplorable since rational and peaceful alternatives could have produced the same results.
Mr. Cassese gives a more favorable assessment to the response of
the Italian Government. The Italians had three main objectives: (1)
isolate, both politically and diplomatically, the terrorists and their
bosses; (2) prevent the Americans from using force; and (3) avoid damage to Italy's good relations with the Arab states and the PLO. However, after the U.S. forced the Egyptian plane to land in Sigonella,
there were few alternatives left open to the Italian Government. The
U.S. requested extradition of the hijackers in accordance with a 1983
extradition treaty between the two countries. Italy felt the situation
was now governed by Italian criminal law and chose to prosecute the
hijackers rather than extradite them to the U.S. Although Cassese feels

176 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 16
that the Italians did breech the 1983 extradition treaty, he explains
that it was their only choice in order to preserve their diplomatic ties in
the Mediterranean. He states that "[i]n the end, one cannot escape the
conclusion that Italy observed international law during the affair when
observance suited it politically."
In conclusion, Mr. Cassese stresses the importance of using diplomacy over violence when dealing with terrorists. He states that multilateral and bi-lateral treaties will not solve every crisis, but that armed
force should only be used in exceptional circumstances when no practical or lawful alternative exists. The author feels that although force
may bring about a quicker resolution in the short-term, the long-term
violence can only damage the fragile relations in the international
sphere.
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ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE
THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY. By Patricia
Adams. Toronto, Canada: Earthscan Publications, Ltd., 1991, 252 pp.
In Odious Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third
World's Environmental Legacy, Patricia Adams, a resource economist
and the Executive Director of Probe International, examines the debt
crises in Third World countries. Ms. Adams argues that the debt crises
resulted from risky loans which were used to finance environmental
projects. Through numerous examples, Ms. Adams explains how immense and expensive environmental projects ultimately failed and left
the countries with environmental disasters. In order to finance these
projects, the Third World countries borrowed billions of dollars from
institutions such as the World Bank. The enormous projects failed, but
the huge debts remained. Anticipated funds from the environmental
projects did not accumulate and, as a result, the debts could not be
repaid. The impoverished countries not only had a destroyed environment, but the countries also had to attempt to repay their debts from
any remaining funds.
In her introduction, Ms. Adams uses the villages along the Northern Thailand's rivers to demonstrate how such communities survived
before various institutions began to finance modern development. The
millions of villagers along northern Thailand's rivers relied on the river
as well as one another to irrigate their crops, water their animals, and
provide for their personal needs. The villagers followed a system called
the "muang faai" water management system and developed rules for
who received how much water and when. In order for all the villagers
to receive enough water to survive, the villagers strictly followed the
system. The system worked well to protect those who lived along the
river and to protect the river itself. In the 1950's, "progress" began
along the rivers of Northern Thailand. With foreign money, engineers
began to build a huge dam and reservoir upstream which controlled the
flow of the river and the irrigation canals. The villagers in the community could no longer control the water. Instead, the officials in the
Royal Irrigation Department controlled the flow of the river. The villagers slowly witnessed the deterioration of their economy and environment. Throughout the book, Ms. Adams utilizes examples such as the
river of Northern Thailand to demonstrate how "modernizing" the environments of Third World countries actually destroyed the environments and resulted in huge unpayable debts for the impoverished
countries.
The book's primary discussion is divided into four parts. The first
part, called "The Environment's Demise," describes additional inci-
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dents of how the environments of Third World countries were destroyed by attempts to modernize the environment -through such methods as building dams, changing irrigation systems and industrialization.
This part also discusses how the environment would sometimes "strike
back" and not allow the attempts at modernization to destroy the environment. For example, developers have tried to develop the river front
property of the Amazon. However, because the environment refuses to
adjust to the forced changes, any development has not only been unsuccessful, but has also resulted in billions of lost dollars. The failed
projects and the enormous debts have forced the Third World countries
to have "asset sales." In order to pay their debts, the Third World
countries sell their assets by getting businesses and banks to move into
their countries and invest in their resources.
The second part, called "Easy Lenders," explains how Third
World countries were able to borrow an enormous amount of money for
projects which did not yield any economic benefit. Various countries
were willing to lend absurd amounts of money as long as their countries
could get various contracts, such as construction, engineering, and supplier contracts. Instead of determining if the project would be successful, the lending countries were determining how the project could benefit their own country. The book uses the Sicartsa, a massive steel
complex in Mexico, as an example of how countries competed with
each other in order to lend Mexico money for this venture.
The third part, called "Eager Borrowers," explains how the Third
World governments were eager to borrow money from rich countries
who were willing to loan them the money. The loans were often lent to
the governments at extremely low interests rates. The loans were used
to pay off the Third World's debts as well as to pay for industrialization projects which failed to reap economic benefit and resulted in enormous debts
The fourth part, called "The Third World's Tax Revolt," explains
how the environmental disasters and accumulated debt have resulted in
unbelievably impoverished countries. The crises became so bad that at
the end of the 1980's, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
called it the "decade of despair." The Third World countries could pay
off these debts by "taxation and privitalization of their assets." However, because the citizens of the Third World countries do not recognize their debts, the countries do not consider taxation and privitalization of their assets as an option. The public refuses to pay for debts
which were accumulated without their knowledge or consent. As a result, the debts have become known as "odious debts."
Ms. Adams concludes by explaining how programs are developing
in the Third World countries which allows the public to borrow small
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amounts of money. Because the borrowers must depend on each other,
the small scale Third World financial systems have proved to be manageable and successful.
Overall, Ms. Adams historical analysis provides an insightful documentation of how the Third World countries accumulated their debts
and the ultimate destruction of their environment in the process. Her
countless examples convincingly demonstrate her point. Ms. Adams,
however, fails to thoroughly examine solutions for the Third World
debt. She briefly discusses some solutions in the last few paragraphs of
the book, but she does not provide the reader with a complete analysis
of the solutions to the problem of "odious debts."
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FAILURE OF THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT: HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1988/1989.
By Ta-Ling Lee and John F. Copper. Baltimore, Maryland: Occasional
Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1991, 146 pp.
This annual update on human rights in the People's Republic of
China (PRC) concentrates on the impact of the Tiananmen Square
tragedy on the PRC. In analyzing its impact, Failure of the Democracy Movement first describes the events surrounding Tiananmen
Square, and then divides the discussion into the political, economic,
cultural, and intellectual developments. The book also addresses the interrelation between these areas.
Chapters Two and Three recount the events leading up to the
Tiananmen Square crackdown. Student protests, initially about the
rampant corruption in the government and the lack of attention to education, soon escalated into demands for democratic reform. Popular
support swelled. Deng Xiaoping, leader of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), was threatened by the widespread protests, and declared
martial law on May 20, 1989. Deng believed nothing less would prevent the collapse of the Communist party and socialist system. Independent organizations estimated the deaths at Tiananmen Square to be
at least 1000.
The events following Tiananmen Square were equally as harsh.
The Communist party ordered mass arrests, executions, and nationwide
security checks. Furthermore, students were required to attend nightly
classes espousing the ideological tenets of socialism. Ironically, as the
CCP tightened its hold on the Chinese people, Communism was collapsing throughout the world, including the overthrow of the Ceausescu
regime in Romania, the collapse of the Berlin wall and the defeat of
Eastern European Communism. Yet, the CCP continued to violate
human rights without major international repercussions. Indeed, the
Bush Administration, in an effort to maintain good trade relations with
China, did little to condemn the flagrant human rights violations.
Many Western scholars interpreted the military suppression as merely
reflecting the cultural differences between China and the West. The
authors of this work reject this theory, asserting that those who rely on
cultural differences ignore the global right to human dignity.
Chapter Four focuses on the political underpinnings operating in
1989. Lee and Copper point out that the Tiananmen incident was
spurred by a power struggle within the top levels of the CCP. An internal struggle between the advocates of democratic reform and the ideological hardliners escalated in the late 1980's. The balance of power,
however, shifted back to the ideologues after martial law was declared.
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Following the Tiananmen tragedy, the hardliners purged reformists
from the party and replaced them with those who believed in ideological orthodoxy, party control, and central planning. Deng, once seen as
a possible reformer, retreated from that position in order to maintain
control of the Chinese people and the dissenters in the CCP. Thus, the
hardliners ensured their continuing vitality. Lee and Copper warn that
the government's harsh responses have disillusioned the Chinese population and further struggle is probable.
This political situation, Lee and Copper explain, was intertwined
with an economic crisis. Inflation, unemployment, decline of agricultural production, and budget deficits unnerved the leaders and angered
the people. The CCP reacted with further economic control and regulation, believing that the economic troubles were an indication of the failure of capitalist reforms. These economic decisions of the party affected the political arena; the tightened control over the economy
resulted in less freedom for the people and more human rights violations, especially against the entrepreneurs who had prospered when the
reformists had greater control. Moreover, the government's increased
role in the economy aggravated the existing tensions between the reformists and the hardliners.
Chapter Six focuses on the effect of Tiananmen on the ideological
liberalization developing in early 1989. Intellectuals were demanding
democracy, freedom of the speech and press, release of political prisoners, and more money for education. After Tiananmen, however, these
intellectuals were persecuted. The press was especially affected - publications were banned and books and magazines were seized. After repeated upheavals, the academic community saw Tiananmen as signalling the demise of reform.
The next chapter provides documentation of executions and other
human rights violations. The government executed people for both political and economic crimes on the basis of vague, nondescript laws.
The authors spotlight some of the more renowned political prisoners,
either imprisoned before Tiananmen or rearrested after the tragedy.
Lee and Copper conclude that the human rights violations in the
PRC are inherent in the system. As long as the leaders remain
grounded in ideological tenets which advocate strict political, economic
and social control, no change will occur. The CCP's reaction to the
mass unrest - the Tiananmen massacre, the nationwide purge and the
social, economic and political control - reversed any prior democratic
progress. The intermittent reforms, including the retirement of old officials, separation of the CCP from the government, local elections, freer
press, and a fair penal code, were lost. The authors lament the fact
that, despite ten years of reform promised by Deng, the PRC remains
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unchanged.
The appendices to the book illustrate the clash of ideologies in the
PRC. The brutality of the government is documented in "Deng Xiaoping's Talk to Martial Law Troops" and "Document 4 of the Party Central Committee on Post-Tiananmen Purge". Advocates of democracy
voice their opinion in "Fang Lizhi's Acceptance Speech for Robert F.
Kennedy Human Rights Award" and "Interview with Guan Weiyan,
Former President of Chinese University of Science and Technology."
Also included is the "Tiananmen Chronology" and a subject index.
This book provides a readable account of the Tiananmen tragedy,
helpful to the student unfamiliar with the PRC, as well as the more
informed scholar. Although the author's division of the book into political, economic and social developments inhibits a chronological narration of the events surrounding the Tiananmen Square tragedy, it does
allow for a tightly focused analysis into each of the key issues that
shape the desperate plight of the PRC.

